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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme 
Court, which vacated our earlier judgment that Appellant 
Carol Anne Bond lacked standing to challenge, on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, her conviction under the penal 
provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229 (the “Act”), 
which implements the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, 
32 I.L.M. 800 (1993) (the “Convention”).  The Supreme 
Court determined that Bond does have standing to advance 
that challenge, and returned the case to us to consider her 
constitutional argument.   
 
In her merits argument, Bond urges us to set aside as 
inapplicable the landmark decision Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416 (1920), which is sometimes cited for the proposition 
that the Tenth Amendment has no bearing on Congress‟s 
ability to legislate in furtherance of the Treaty Power in 
Article II, § 2 of the Constitution.  Cognizant of the widening 
scope of issues taken up in international agreements, as well 
as the renewed vigor with which principles of federalism have 
been employed by the Supreme Court in scrutinizing 
assertions of federal authority, we agree with Bond that 
treaty-implementing legislation ought not, by virtue of that 
status alone, stand immune from scrutiny under principles of 
federalism.  However, because the Convention is an 
international agreement with a subject matter that lies at the 
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core of the Treaty Power and because Holland instructs that 
“there can be no dispute about the validity of [a] statute” that 
implements a valid treaty, 252 U.S. at 432, we will affirm 
Bond‟s conviction.  
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
A. Facts 
 
Bond‟s criminal acts are detailed in our prior opinion, 
United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“Bond I”), and in the Supreme Court‟s opinion, Bond v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360-61 (2011) (“Bond II”), 
so we provide only a brief recitation here.  Suffice it to say 
that, while Bond was employed by the chemical manufacturer 
Rohm and Haas, she learned that her friend Myrlinda Hanes 
was pregnant and that Bond‟s own husband was the baby‟s 
father.  Bond became intent on revenge.  To that end, she set 
about acquiring highly toxic chemicals, stealing 10-
chlorophenoxarsine from her employer and purchasing 
potassium dichromate over the Internet.  She then applied 
those chemicals to Hanes‟s mailbox, car door handles, and 
house doorknob.  Bond‟s poisonous activities were eventually 
discovered and she was indicted on two counts of acquiring, 
transferring, receiving, retaining, or possessing a chemical 
weapon, in violation of the Act.  She was, in addition, 
charged with two counts of theft of mail matter, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1708.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Bond filed a motion to dismiss the counts that alleged 
violations of the Act.  She argued that the Act was 
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unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to her.  More 
particularly, she said that the Act violated constitutional “fair 
notice” requirements, that it was inconsistent with the 
Convention it was meant to implement, and that it represented 
a breach of the Tenth Amendment‟s protection of state 
sovereignty.  Emphasizing that last point, Bond contended 
that neither the Commerce Clause, nor the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in connection with the Treaty Power, could 
support the expansive wording of the statute, let alone her 
prosecution.  (See App. at 59 (arguing that, “[g]iven the 
localized … scope of the conduct alleged, … application of 
18 U.S.C. § 229 signals a massive and unjustifiable expansion 
of federal law enforcement into state-regulated domain”).)  
The government‟s response has shifted over time,1 but it has 
been consistent in maintaining that the Act is a constitutional 
                                              
1
 The government has, at different stages of this case, 
been willing to jettison one legal position and adopt a 
different one, as seemed convenient.  Before the District 
Court, it expressly disclaimed the Commerce Clause as a 
basis for Congress‟s power to approve the Act.  (See E.D. Pa. 
No. 07-cr-528, doc. no. 30, at 7 (“Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 229 was not enacted under the interstate 
commerce authority but under Congress‟s authority to 
implement treaties.”).)  The government still maintained that 
position the first time it appeared before us, relying only on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause in support of the Act‟s 
constitutionality.  (See Appellee‟s Initial Br. at 20-32.)  Once 
before the Supreme Court, however, the government decided 
that this is really a Commerce Clause case and that the 
position it had pressed before us is secondary.  That change 
was in addition to abandoning the position on standing that it 
had previously taken.  See infra note 2.   
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exercise of Congress‟s authority to enact treaty-implementing 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The 
District Court accepted that argument and denied Bond‟s 
motion to dismiss.   
We affirmed on appeal, concluding that Bond lacked 
standing to pursue her Tenth Amendment challenge and that 
the Act was neither unconstitutionally vague nor 
unconstitutionally overbroad.
2
  Bond I, 581 F.3d at 139.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of 
“[w]hether a criminal defendant convicted under a federal 
statute has standing to challenge her conviction on grounds 
that, as applied to her, the statute is beyond the federal 
                                              
2
 We determined that Bond lacked standing to pursue 
her Tenth Amendment challenge after requesting 
supplemental briefing on the question of whether she “ha[d] 
standing to assert that 18 U.S.C. § 229 encroaches on state 
sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution absent the involvement of a state 
or its instrumentalities[.]”  (United States v. Bond, No. 08-
2677, 08/14/2009 Letter to Counsel.)  The government 
responded that Bond lacked such standing under Tennessee 
Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 
118 (1939), which held that “appellants, absent the states or 
their officers, have no standing … to raise any question under 
the [Tenth] [A]mendment,” id. at 144.  (United States v. 
Bond, No. 08-2677, 08/20/2009 Letter from Appellee.)  
Before the Supreme Court, however, the government reversed 
course and argued that Bond did have standing to make a 
Tenth Amendment challenge.  See Bond II, 131 S. Ct. at 2361 
(describing the government‟s initial “position that Bond did 
not have standing” and the changed position before the 
Supreme Court that “Bond does have standing”).  
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government‟s enumerated powers and inconsistent with the 
Tenth Amendment.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bond v. 
United States (No. 09-1227), 2010 WL 1506717 at *i; see 
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010).  Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that Bond “does have standing to challenge 
the federal statute.”  Bond II, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.  The case 
was remanded to us to address the “issue of the statute‟s 
validity” which, as the Court instructed, “turns in part on 
whether the law can be deemed „necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution‟ the President‟s Article II, § 2 Treaty 
Power.”  Id. at 2367 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). 
 
II. Discussion
3
 
 
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court declared 
that, if a treaty is valid, “there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute [implementing it] under Article 1, 
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the 
powers of the Government.”4  252 U.S. at 432.  Implicit in 
                                              
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742, and review de novo a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a criminal statute, Bond I, 581 F.3d at 
133. 
4
 The referenced section of the Constitution is the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, which provides Congress with 
the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
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that statement is the premise that principles of federalism will 
ordinarily impose no limitation on Congress‟s ability to write 
laws supporting treaties, because the only relevant question is 
whether the underlying treaty is valid.  See id. at 432, 434 
(stating that “it is not enough to refer to the Tenth 
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United 
States” because the Treaty Power is delegated, but 
acknowledging the possibility that there may sometimes be 
“invisible radiation[s] from the general terms of the Tenth 
Amendment”).  Reasoning that a reading of Holland that 
categorically rejects federalism as a check on Congress‟s 
treaty-implementing authority is of questionable 
constitutional validity, Bond asks us to invalidate her 
conviction because the Act is unconstitutional as applied to 
her.
5
  She says that to hold otherwise would offend the 
                                              
5
 It appears that Bond has abandoned her facial 
challenge to the Act.  Her argument, both in her supplemental 
briefing before us and at oral argument, is articulated as an 
as-applied challenge.  (See, e.g., Appellant‟s Supp. Br. at 26 
(“Bond is raising a … limited and narrowly focused as-
applied challenge.  She contends that, whatever its validity 
more generally, the statute cannot be constitutionally applied 
to her in the circumstances of this case.”); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 11-13, United States v. Bond, No. 08-2677 (“3d 
Cir. Argument”).)  And, Bond‟s counsel commented at oral 
argument that he was “trying ... [to be] respectful of the 
Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence that says you don‟t lightly 
bring a facial challenge” to a statute.  (3d Cir. Argument at 
62.)  Counsel framed his argument as being that “the 
principle[] that [the statute has] offended is that if you apply it 
so broadly that it criminalizes every malicious use of 
poisoning, then you‟ve overridden the structural limitations 
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Constitution‟s balance of power between state and federal 
authority by “intrud[ing] … on the traditional state 
prerogative to punish assaults.”  (Appellant‟s Supp. Br. at 47.)   
 
A. Constitutional Avoidance 
 
Bond first argues, however, that we should avoid 
reaching the constitutional question by construing the Act not 
to apply to her conduct at all.
6
   
 
Her avoidance argument begins with the text of the 
Act itself, which provides, in pertinent part, that “it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly … to develop, produce, 
                                                                                                     
on the government and the division of power between the 
federal government and the states.”  (Id. at 15-16.)  We thus 
take it as granted that, although some of her past arguments 
move into the territory of a facial challenge, Bond is not now 
saying that Congress was without power to pass the Act but 
is, instead, arguing that Congress could not properly pass it if 
the Act‟s language is interpreted in a way that reaches her 
conduct.  In short, we are dealing with an as-applied, rather 
than a facial, challenge. 
6
 Bond‟s constitutional avoidance argument 
necessarily presumes a serious constitutional problem, 
notwithstanding Holland.  See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. 
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (stating the constitutional avoidance inquiry 
should be undertaken in the face of “serious constitutional 
problems”).  Regardless of Holland‟s breadth, we accept 
Bond‟s suggestion that it is prudent to begin our analysis with 
the avoidance doctrine. 
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otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, 
stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any 
chemical weapon.”  18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1).  The term 
“chemical weapon” is defined broadly to include any “toxic 
chemical and its precursors,” id. § 229F(1)(A), and “[t]he 
term „toxic chemical‟ means any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals,” id. 
§  229F(8)(A).  Congress did put some limit on the sweep of 
the Act by excluding from the definition of “chemical 
weapon” any chemicals and precursors “intended for a 
purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type 
and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.”  Id. 
§ 229F(1)(A).  The phrase “purpose not prohibited under this 
chapter,” is then defined, in part, as “[a]ny peaceful purpose 
related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.”  Id. § 229F(7)(A).  
It is that “peaceful purpose” language that Bond urges us to 
take as our interpretive lodestar.   
 
Specifically, Bond argues that, by looking to the 
“peaceful purpose” exception, we can employ a “common 
sense interpretation of § 229” that avoids “mak[ing] every 
malicious use of a household chemical” – including her own 
– a federal offense.  (Appellant‟s Supp. Br. at 17.)  All we 
need do is “interpret the statute … to reach [only the kind of 
acts] that would violate the Convention if undertaken by a 
signatory state.”  (Id. at 14.)  In other words, as Bond sees it, 
the modifier “peaceful” should be understood in 
contradistinction to “warlike” (3d Cir. Argument at 23), and, 
when so understood, the statute will not reach “conduct that 
no signatory state could possibly engage in – such as using 
chemicals in an effort to poison a romantic rival,” as Bond 
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did.  (Appellant‟s Supp. Br. at 40.)  That interpretation is 
tempting, in light of the challenges inherent in the Act‟s 
remarkably broad language,
7
 but, as we held the first time we 
had this case, Bond‟s behavior “clearly constituted unlawful 
possession and use of a chemical weapon under § 229.”  Bond 
I, 581 F.3d at 139.   
 
That holding is in better keeping with the Act‟s use of 
the term “peaceful purpose” than the construction Bond 
would have us give it.  The ordinary meaning of “peaceful” is 
                                              
7
 The Act‟s breadth is certainly striking, seeing as it 
turns each kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America 
into a potential chemical weapons cache.  Cf. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 29, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 
(2011) (No. 09-1227) (Justice Alito‟s statement during oral 
argument that “pouring a bottle of vinegar in [a] friend‟s 
goldfish bowl” could constitute the use of a chemical weapon 
under the Act and expose a person to years in federal prison).  
We observed as much the last time this case was before us, 
noting, as Bond had herself acknowledged at the time, that 
the Act‟s wide net was cast “for obvious reasons.”  Bond I, 
581 F.3d at 139.  Ultimately, however, we concluded that the 
Act was not unconstitutionally overbroad.  See id. (observing 
that the Act is “certainly broad,” but not unconstitutionally 
so).  Bond did not challenge that determination, see Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Bond v. United States (No. 09-1227), 
2010 WL 1506717 at *i, and it remains undisturbed.  That the 
Act is not unconstitutionally overbroad, of course, does not 
preclude Bond from arguing, as she now does, that the Act 
offends the Constitution‟s division of power between the 
federal government and the states to the extent it is used to 
make her conduct a federal crime. 
12 
 
“untroubled by conflict, agitation, or commotion,” “of or 
relating to a state or time of peace,” or “devoid of violence or 
force,” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 852 (10th 
ed. 2002), and Bond‟s “deploy[ment of] highly toxic 
chemicals with the intent of harming Haynes,” Bond I, 581 
F.3d at 139, can hardly be characterized as “peaceful” under 
that word‟s commonly understood meaning, cf. Jones v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857-58 (2000) (interpreting the 
federal arson statute not to reach “traditionally local criminal 
conduct” since the statute was “susceptible of two 
constructions” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The term “peaceful,” moreover, does not appear in 
isolation: the Act only excludes from its ambit “peaceful 
purpose[s] … related to an industrial, agricultural, research, 
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity.”  18 
U.S.C. § 229F(7)(A) (emphasis added).  Bond‟s attacks on 
Haynes – even if non-warlike – were certainly not “related to 
an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
pharmaceutical activity.”  Id.  Nor can her use of chemicals 
be said to be a “peaceful purpose[] … related to an … other 
activity,” because regarding her assaultive behavior as such 
would improperly expand § 229F(7)(A)‟s scope.   See, e.g., 
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 129 (1936) (“The rule 
of ejusdem generis … [o]rdinarily … limits general terms 
which follow specific ones to matters similar to those 
specified.”).  
 
Thus, while one may well question whether Congress 
envisioned the Act being applied in a case like this, the 
language itself does cover Bond‟s criminal conduct.  And, 
given the clarity of the statute, we cannot avoid the 
constitutional question presented.  See United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (stating that only 
13 
 
“„ambiguous statutory language [should] be construed to 
avoid serious constitutional doubts‟” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 
(1985) (“We cannot press statutory construction „to the point 
of disingenuous evasion‟ even to avoid a constitutional 
question.” (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 
289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933))).  It is not our prerogative to 
rewrite a statute, and we see no sound basis on which we can 
accept Bond‟s construction of the Act without usurping 
Congress‟s legislative role.  Though we agree it would be 
better, if possible, to apply a limiting construction to the Act 
rather than consider Bond‟s argument that it is 
unconstitutional, see Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 
295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide 
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely 
necessary to a decision of the case”), the statute speaks with 
sufficient certainty that we feel compelled to consider the 
hard question presented in this appeal. 
 
B. Constitutionality of the Act as Applied 
 
Understanding whether application of the Act to Bond 
violates the structural limits of federalism begins with the 
Tenth Amendment, which Bond cites and which provides that 
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
X.  That text, as the Supreme Court has observed, “confirms 
that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits 
that may … reserve power to the States.”  New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).  Thus, it encapsulates the 
principles of federalism upon which our nation was founded.  
See D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn’t True? The 
14 
 
Tenth Amendment and Executive War Power, 51 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 135, 143-44 (2001) (describing the argument that “the 
Tenth Amendment has a declaratory function and provides a 
rule of constitutional interpretation rather than a rule of 
constitutional law”).8 
                                              
8
 We do not need to determine whether the Tenth 
Amendment is a tautology reflecting the structural limitations 
on federal power embodied in the system of dual sovereignty 
established by the Constitution, or, as has sometimes been 
suggested, serves as an independent check on federal power.  
See New York, 505 U.S. at 156, 160 (describing the argument 
that, even when Congress has the authority to regulate, “the 
Tenth Amendment limits the power of Congress to regulate in 
the way it has chosen,” though noting that its actual limit “is 
not derived from the text” of the Tenth Amendment as the 
Tenth Amendment is “essentially a tautology”); Nat’l League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (recognizing a 
“limit[] upon the power of Congress to override state 
sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary 
powers … which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution” 
and that “an express declaration of this limitation is found in 
the Tenth Amendment”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); cf. Gerard N. 
Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: 
Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases, 95 Geo. L.J. 119, 125 n.30 
(2006) (suggesting the Tenth Amendment‟s “independent 
force” is limited to “[l]aws that regulate states qua states”).  
Regardless of whether the Tenth Amendment has 
“independent force of its own,” Bond II, 131 S. Ct. at 2367, 
we understand our constitutional inquiry to turn on whether 
principles of federalism are violated by the Act, in light of the 
Constitution‟s delegation to the President of the power “to 
15 
 
Endeavoring to discover what impact the Tenth 
Amendment may have on treaty-implementing legislation 
immediately leads, as we have indicated, to the Supreme 
Court‟s decision in Missouri v. Holland.  The statute at issue 
in that case, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, 
implemented a treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain that banned the hunting of migratory birds during 
certain seasons.  Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.  The State of 
Missouri brought suit against a U.S. game warden, arguing 
that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with the rights 
reserved to Missouri by the Tenth Amendment because 
Missouri was free to do what it wished with the birds while 
they were within its borders.  Id. at 431-32.  The Supreme 
Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, rejected that 
argument, reasoning that “it is not enough to refer to the 
Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the 
United States, because by Article 2, Section 2, the power to 
make treaties is delegated expressly.”  Id. at 432. 
 
As noted earlier, the Court made it clear that Congress 
may, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, legislate to 
implement a valid treaty, regardless of whether Congress 
would otherwise have the power to act or whether the 
legislation causes an intrusion into what would otherwise be 
within the state‟s traditional province.  Id. at 432-33.  While 
                                                                                                     
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and to Congress of the 
power to enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution … all other Powers vested by 
th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any Department or Officer thereof,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 18.  
16 
 
the Court did allow that there may be “qualifications to the 
treaty-making power,” it also said, somewhat obscurely, that 
they had to be found “in a different way” than one might find 
limitations on other grants of power to the federal 
government.  Id. at 433.  After implying that Congress‟s 
powers are particularly sweeping when dealing with “matters 
requiring national action,” the Court suggested one limitation 
on the Treaty Power: if the implementation of a treaty 
“contravene[s] any prohibitory words to be found in the 
Constitution,” then it may be unconstitutional.  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Since the treaty in question did not do that, the only 
remaining question was “whether it [was] forbidden by some 
invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 433-34.  The Court concluded that it was 
not.  See id. (reasoning that, while “the great body of private 
relations usually fall within the control of the State, ... a treaty 
may override its power”).  Finally, the Court assumed without 
further discussion that, because the treaty was valid, so was 
the implementing statute.  See id. at 435 (“We see nothing in 
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while 
a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and 
our crops are destroyed.”). 
 
 In sum, Holland teaches that, when there is a valid 
treaty, Congress has authority to enact implementing 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if it 
might otherwise lack the ability to legislate in the domain in 
question.
9
  See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 
                                              
9
 It has been argued that Holland incorrectly permits 
“treaties … [to] expand the legislative power of Congress.”  
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing The Treaty Power, 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867, 1875 (2005).  The Cato Institute has 
17 
 
(2004) (“[A]s Justice Holmes pointed out [in Holland], 
treaties made pursuant to [the Treaty Power] can authorize 
Congress to deal with „matters‟ with which otherwise 
„Congress could not deal.‟” (quoting Holland, 252 U.S. at 
433)).  The legislation must, of course, meet the Necessary 
and Proper Clause‟s general requirement that legislation 
implemented under that Clause be “rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010); see 
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 
(1819) (“[A]ll means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”).  
                                                                                                     
submitted an amicus brief taking that position, arguing 
against Holland‟s “impl[ication] that if a treaty commits the 
United States to enact some legislation, then Congress 
automatically obtains the power to enact that legislation, even 
if it would lack such power in the absence of the treaty.”  
(Amicus Br. at 6.)  Amicus argues that Congress‟s authority 
to act in connection with the Treaty Power only permits it to 
enact those laws that are necessary and proper to permit the 
President to make treaties – not to implement treaties once 
they are agreed upon.  (See id. (arguing the President cannot 
increase Congress‟s power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause by entering into a treaty).)  Under that view, Congress 
could, for example, legislate to provide funding for an office 
of treaty-making, but could not have implemented the broadly 
worded Convention involved here.  (See id. at 8 (“[T]his 
power would … embrace any … laws necessary and proper to 
ensuring the wise use of the power to enter treaties.”).)  
Holland remains binding precedent, however, and forecloses 
this line of reasoning. 
18 
 
In the treaty context, that requirement has been understood to 
mean that a treaty and its implementing legislation must be 
rationally related to one another.  United States v. Ferreira, 
275 F.3d 1020, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001).  Thus, as long as “the 
effectuating legislation bear[s] a rational relationship to” a 
valid treaty, United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 
1998), the arguable consequence of Holland is that treaties 
and associated legislation are simply not subject to Tenth 
Amendment scrutiny, no matter how far into the realm of 
states‟ rights the President and Congress may choose to 
venture.  See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and 
American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 395 (1998) 
(taking exception with Holland to the extent it can be read to 
say that “the treaty power is immune from federalism 
restrictions because that power has been exclusively 
delegated to the federal government”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 287 (4th ed. 
2011) (stating that the Holland court “rejected the claim that 
state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment limit the scope of 
the treaty power”); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the 
U.S. Constitution 191 (2nd ed. 1996) (“What [Holland] said, 
simply, was that the Constitution delegated powers to various 
branches of the federal government, not only to Congress; the 
Treaty Power was delegated to the federal treaty-makers, a 
delegation additional to and independent of the delegations to 
Congress.  Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the 
federal government, whatever is within its scope is not 
reserved to the states: the Tenth Amendment is not material.” 
(internal footnote omitted)).  But see David M. Golove, 
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of 
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1075, 1085 (2000) (noting that “treaties are not immune 
from federalism limitations, and nothing in [Holland] 
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suggests the contrary,” but acknowledging that “it is difficult 
to imagine realistic scenarios in which treaty stipulations 
would violate [the applicable] limitations”). 
 
Bond vigorously disputes the implications of that 
conclusion.  Specifically, she argues that legal trends since 
the Supreme Court‟s 1920 decision in Holland make it clear 
that the Tenth Amendment should not be treated as irrelevant 
when examining the validity of treaty-implementing 
legislation.  (See Appellant‟s Supp. Br. at 24 (“[I]n recent 
decades, the Supreme Court has reasserted the critical role of 
the Tenth Amendment in preserving the proper balance of 
authority between federal and state government to ensure that 
all levels of government represent and remain accountable to 
the People.”).)  Concluding otherwise, she asserts, would 
make “nothing … off-limits” in a world where, more and 
more, “international treaties govern[] a virtually unlimited 
range of subjects and intrud[e] deeply on internal concerns.”  
(See id. at 20.)  That latter point is not without merit.  
Juxtaposed against increasingly broad conceptions of the 
Treaty Power‟s scope, reading Holland to confer on Congress 
an unfettered ability to effectuate what would now be 
considered by some to be valid exercises of the Treaty Power 
runs a significant risk of disrupting the delicate balance 
between state and federal authority.
10
   
                                              
10
 The Supreme Court has focused renewed attention 
on federalism over the last two decades.  Although many 
earlier cases reflect the importance of the our Constitution‟s 
basic provision for dual sovereigns, see, e.g., Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (observing that the rule 
requiring Congress to speak clearly in order to preempt state 
law “acknowledg[es] that the States retain substantial 
20 
 
                                                                                                     
sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme”); South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (recognizing 
that Congress may not coerce the states when exercising its 
power to spend), more recent cases have been particularly 
pointed in describing the role federalism principles should 
play in analyzing assertions of federal authority.  That trend 
began at least as early as the Court‟s decision in New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which held that the 
federal government could not “commandeer[] the legislative 
processes of the States.”  Id. at 176 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  After New York, the Court struck 
down legislation criminalizing local conduct in United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), as beyond the Commerce 
Clause Power.  In doing so the Court recognized the 
importance of the states‟ authority to “defin[e] and enforc[e] 
the criminal law,” and noted that, “[w]hen Congress 
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the 
States, it effects a change in the sensitive relation between 
federal and state criminal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 561 n.3 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  In Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997), the Court likewise 
considered principles of federalism in striking down 
legislation that required state police to perform background 
checks on potential gun owners.  See id. at 19 (noting the 
establishment of dual sovereignties was “reflected throughout 
the Constitution‟s text,” and had vested in the states “„a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty.‟” (quoting The 
Federalist No. 39 (James Madison))).  Similarly, in United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court struck 
down legislation making it a federal offense to commit a 
crime of violence motivated by gender, observing that “[t]he 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly 
21 
 
Those concerns notwithstanding, Bond does not argue 
that the Convention itself is constitutionally infirm.  On the 
contrary, she admits “that a treaty restricting chemical 
weapons is a „proper subject[] of negotiations between our 
government and other nations.‟”  (Id. at 4-5 (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)).  Accordingly, we need not 
tackle, head on, whether an arguably invalid treaty has led to 
legislation encroaching on matters traditionally left to the 
police powers of the states.  Nevertheless, resolving the 
argument Bond does lodge against her prosecution requires at 
least some consideration of whether the Convention is, in 
fact, valid.  See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (“If the treaty is 
valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute 
… .” (emphasis added)).  We therefore turn briefly to whether 
the Convention falls within the Treaty Power‟s appropriate 
scope, bearing in mind that Bond seems to accept that it does. 
 
 1. The Convention’s Validity 
 
The Constitution does not have within it any explicit 
subject matter limitation on the power granted in Article II, 
§ 2.  That section states simply that the President has the 
“Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Throughout much of 
American history, however, including when Holland was 
handed down, it was understood that the Treaty Power was 
                                                                                                     
national and what is truly local,” id. at 617-18, and that there 
was “no better example of the police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the 
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication 
of its victims,” id. at 618.   
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impliedly limited to certain subject matters.  See Bradley, 
supra, at 429 (arguing that “a subject matter limitation [on the 
Treaty Power] appears to have been assumed both during the 
Founding and at times during the nineteenth century,” and 
suggesting it was likewise assumed by the Holland court); 
Golove, supra, at 1288 (“[V]irtually every authority, 
including the Supreme Court, has on countless occasions 
from the earliest days recognized general subject matter 
limitations on treaties.”).   
 
Contemporaneous records such as the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention show that the Founders generally 
accepted that the purpose of treaties was, as James Madison 
put it, to regulate “intercourse with foreign nations,” and that 
the “exercise” of the Treaty Power was expected to be 
“consistent with” those “external” ends.11  3 The Debates in 
                                              
11
 Other Founders shared Madison‟s understanding that 
the Treaty Power would be limited to matters involving 
foreign affairs.  Cf. The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay) (noting 
that the “power of making treaties is an important one, 
especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce”); The 
Federalist No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that treaties 
“[were] not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, 
but agreements between sovereign and sovereign”).  
Notwithstanding the Founders‟ view of the Treaty Power‟s 
inherent limits, there is, again, nothing in the Constitution‟s 
text explicitly confining that power.  The basis for that 
omission is perhaps best explained by Madison, who, like 
others, recognized the need for flexibility with respect to the 
Treaty Power and cautioned against expressly defining its 
scope: 
I do not think it possible to enumerate all the 
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The Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Constitution 514-15 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1941) (“The 
Virginia Debates”); see The Federalist No. 45 (James 
Madison) (stating that the Treaty Power “will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, 
and foreign commerce”).  As Madison later explained,  if 
there was 
 
no limitation on the Treaty-making power …, it 
might admit of a doubt whether the United 
States might not be enabled to do those things 
by Treaty which are forbidden to be done by 
Congress …; but no such consequence can 
follow, for it is a sound rule of construction, 
that what is forbidden to be done by all the 
branches of Government conjointly, cannot be 
done by one or more of them separately. 
5 Annals of Congress 671 (1796) (emphasis added).   
 
                                                                                                     
cases in which such external regulations would 
be necessary.  Would it be right to define all the 
cases in which Congress could exercise this 
authority[?]  The definition might, and probably 
would, be defective.  They might be restrained, 
by such a definition, from exercising the 
authority where it would be essential to the 
interest and safety of the community.  It is most 
safe, therefore, to leave it to be exercised as 
contingencies may arise. 
The Virginia Debates, supra, at 514-15.    
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Early cases followed that reasoning and indicated that 
the Treaty Power is confined to matters traditionally 
understood to be of international concern.  See, e.g., Ross v. 
McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) (“The treaty-making 
power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects 
of negotiation with foreign governments.”); De Geofroy v. 
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) (“That the treaty power of 
the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation 
between our government and the governments of other 
nations is clear.”); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 
(1872) (“[I]nasmuch as the power is given, in general terms, 
without any description of the objects intended to be 
embraced within its scope, it must be assumed that the 
framers of the Constitution intended that it should extend to 
all those objects which in the intercourse of nations had 
usually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation 
and treaty … .”).   
 
That is not to say, however, that any treaty 
encroaching on matters ordinarily left to the states was 
considered to be beyond the Treaty Power‟s permissible 
ambit.  On the contrary, so long as the subject matter 
limitation was satisfied – which it undoubtedly was in cases 
involving “subjects [such as] peace, alliance, commerce, 
neutrality, and others of a similar nature,” William Rawle, A 
View of the Constitution of the United States 65 (2d ed. 1829), 
or, as Jay put it, “war, peace, and commerce,” The Federalist 
No. 64 (John Jay) – it was accepted that treaties could affect 
domestic issues.  Many early decisions of the Supreme Court 
upheld treaties of that nature, including treaties regarding the 
ownership and transfer of property.  See, e.g., Carneal v. 
Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181, 189 (1825) (treaty between 
the United States and France that allowed citizens of either 
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country to hold lands in the other).  Still, it was widely 
accepted that the Treaty Power was inherently limited in the 
subject matter it could properly be used to address, see 
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (“The 
treatymaking power is broad enough to cover all subjects that 
properly pertain to our foreign relations … .”); Asakura v. 
City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (“The treaty-making 
power of the United States … does not extend „so far as to 
authorize what the Constitution forbids,‟ … [but] does extend 
to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government 
and other nations.”), and that the purpose of limiting the 
Treaty Power to matters which “in the ordinary intercourse of 
nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and 
treaty” was to ensure that treaties were “consistent with … 
the distribution of powers between the general and state 
governments,” Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 
(1840). 
 
Despite the long history of that view of the Treaty 
Power, the tide of opinion, at least in some quarters, has 
shifted decisively in the last half-century.  Many influential 
voices now urge that there is no limitation on the Treaty 
Power, at least not in the way understood from the founding 
through to the middle of the Twentieth Century.
12
  See 
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 Although at least one commentator has disputed that 
shift, see Golove, supra, at 1281, 1289 (stating that 
“commentators … have not rejected subject matter 
limitations” to the treaty power and arguing that, “[w]ere the 
President and Senate to make a treaty on a subject 
inappropriate for negotiation and agreement, and thus beyond 
the scope of the treaty power, the treaty would be invalid 
under the Tenth Amendment”), even then it has been 
26 
 
Bradley, supra, at 433 (describing the “rejection of a subject 
                                                                                                     
acknowledged that “the traditional subject matter limitations 
on treaties are very general, and with globalization, the 
matters appropriate for treaties have expanded and will 
continue to do so,” id. at 1291.  That reality has been borne 
out by the kinds of conventions now extant in the 
international community.  See Bradley, supra, at 397 n.29 
(citing to, inter alia, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, open for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456 
(1989); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-38 
(1994); and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, open for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 
I.L.M. 360 (1967)).  Considering the expanding subjects 
taken up in treaty-making and the nebulous standards 
associated with any lingering subject matter limitation, see 
Golove, supra, at 1090 (“The implication is clear: the 
President and Senate can make treaties on any subject 
appropriate for negotiation and agreement among states.” 
(emphasis added)); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1261 
n.133 (1995)  (“The Treaty Power is legitimate only for 
international agreements fairly related to foreign relations” 
(emphasis added)), whether the subject matter limitation has 
fully eroded is a serious question.  For now, however, it is 
enough to note that, at least among certain commentators, it is 
no longer viewed as a meaningful restraint on the Treaty 
Power.  Cf. Henkin, supra, at 197 & n.89 (citing the Third 
Restatement for the proposition that a limitation on the Treaty 
Power to matters of international concern “has now been 
authoritatively abandoned”). 
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matter limitation on the treaty power” as “the accepted 
view”).  That change is reflected in the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) (the 
“Third Restatement”), which declares flatly that,“[c]ontrary 
to what was once suggested, the Constitution does not require 
that an international agreement deal only with „matters of 
international concern.‟”13  Third Restatement § 302 cmt. c; 
see id. § 303(1) (“[T]he President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, may make any international agreement 
of the United States in the form of a treaty.”).   
 
Whatever the Treaty Power‟s proper bounds may be, 
however, we are confident that the Convention we are dealing 
with here falls comfortably within them.  The Convention, 
after all, regulates the proliferation and use of chemical 
weapons.  One need not be a student of modern warfare to 
have some appreciation for the devastation chemical weapons 
can cause and the corresponding impetus for international 
collaboration to take steps against their use.  Given its 
quintessentially international character, we conclude that the 
Convention is valid under any reasonable conception of the 
Treaty Power‟s scope.  In fact, as we discuss at greater length 
herein, because the Convention relates to war, peace, and 
                                              
13
 It, evidently, is not alone in that view.  See, e.g., 
Tribe, supra, at 1261 n.133 (“[E]stablishment of a joint, 
binational health care system by a treaty followed by 
implementing legislation would presumably be possible … 
.”); Henkin, supra, at 474 (“[W]hat is essentially a matter of 
„domestic concern‟ becomes a matter of „international 
concern‟ if nations do, in fact, decide to bargain about it.”). 
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perhaps commerce,
14
 it fits at the core of the Treaty Power.  
See infra note 18. 
2. Interpreting Holland  
 
Because Holland clearly instructs that “there can be no 
dispute about the validity of [a] statute” that implements a 
valid treaty, 252 U.S. at 432, the constitutionality of Bond‟s 
prosecution would seem to turn on whether the Act goes 
beyond what is necessary and proper to carry the Convention 
into effect, or, in other words, whether the Act fails to “bear a 
rational relationship to” the Convention, Lue, 134 F.3d at 84.  
According to Bond, however, only a simplistic reading of 
Holland could lead one to think that the Supreme Court was 
saying that “Congress‟s power to implement treaties is 
subject to no limit other than affirmative restrictions on 
government power like the First Amendment.”  (Appellant‟s 
Supp. Reply Br. at 9-10.)   
 
The problem with Bond‟s attack is that, with 
practically no qualifying language in Holland to turn to, we 
are bound to take at face value the Supreme Court‟s statement 
that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute … as a necessary and proper means to 
execute the powers of the Government.”  252 U.S. at 432.  A 
plurality of the Supreme Court itself apparently gave that 
passage the simplistic reading Bond denounces when it said, 
in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), that: 
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 Because we conclude that the Act is valid under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, we express no opinion as to the 
merits of the Government‟s newly-discovered Commerce 
Clause argument. 
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The Court [in Holland] was concerned with the 
Tenth Amendment which reserves to the States 
or the people all power not delegated to the 
National Government.  To the extent that the 
United States can validly make treaties, the 
people and the States have delegated their 
power to the National Government and the 
Tenth Amendment is no barrier. 
 
Id. at 18. 
 
It is true that Justice Holmes spoke later in Holland in 
language that implies a balancing of the national interest 
against the interest claimed by the State, see Holland, 252 
U.S. at 435 (“Here a national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude is involved.”), but that was in the context of 
assessing the validity of the Migratory Bird Treaty itself, not 
the implementing statute.  That the latter was constitutional in 
light of the validity of the former seemed to the Supreme 
Court to require no further comment at all.
15
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 Bond recognizes that the Holland court “treated the 
legislation and treaty as co-extensive.”  (Appellant‟s Supp. 
Br. at 23.)  Her conclusion from that is that when a treaty and 
its implementing legislation are not coextensive, the 
justification for enacting the legislation under the Necessary 
and Proper clause can collapse.  We do not disagree; as noted, 
a treaty and treaty-implementing legislation must be 
“rationally related.”  Ferreira, 275 F.3d at 1027.  As we 
discuss at greater length infra, however, the Act and the 
Convention with which we are dealing here are coextensive at 
least on the question of “use,” which is the only point relevant 
to Bond‟s as-applied challenge.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
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That does not mean, of course, that the Holland court 
would have spoken in the same unqualified terms had it 
foreseen the late Twentieth Century‟s changing claims about 
the limits of the Treaty Power, or had it been faced with a 
treaty that transgressed the traditional subject matter 
limitation.
16
  See id. at 433 (“The case before us must be 
considered in light of our whole experience and not merely in 
that of what was said a hundred years ago.”).  It may well 
have chosen to say more about how to assess the validity of a 
treaty, and hence of coextensive treaty-implementing 
legislation.  Perhaps Holland‟s vague comment about 
“invisible radiation[s] from the general terms of the Tenth 
Amendment,” id. at 434, would have been given some further 
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 The treaty at issue in Holland involved a subject of 
traditional international concern.  See 56 Cong. Rec. 7361 
(1918) (legislative testimony that the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act “is essential to the preservation of our cotton, grain, and 
timber crops, whilst the migratory game birds contribute 
materially to our food supply.  The bill may well be 
considered a measure of importance as affecting the 
successful prosecution of the war in which we are now 
engaged”).  As the Holland court noted, “nothing in the 
Constitution … compel[led] the Government to sit by while a 
food supply [was] cut off and the protectors of our forests and 
our crops [were] destroyed.”  252 U.S. at 435.  Consequently, 
the treaty dealt with “a national interest of very nearly the 
first magnitude” that could “only [be furthered] by national 
action in concert with that of another power.”  Id. at 435; see 
id. at 433 (stating that the treaty dealt with a “matter[] of the 
sharpest exigency” and that “the States individually [were] 
incompetent to act”). 
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explication.  As we have previously described, when Holland 
was decided, and, more importantly, when the Founders 
created the Treaty Power, it was generally understood that 
treaties should concern only matters that were clearly 
“international” in character, matters which, in Holland‟s 
words, invoke a national interest that “can be protected only 
by national action in concert with that of another [sovereign 
nation].”  Id. at 435.  All the authors of The Federalist Papers, 
along with others from that era, considered the Treaty Power 
to be a necessary attribute of the central government for the 
important but limited purpose of permitting our “intercourse 
with foreign nations,” The Virginia Debates, supra, at 514 
(statement of James Madison), and thereby allowing for 
compacts “especially as [they] relate[] to war, peace, and 
commerce,” The Federalist No. 64 (John Jay); see supra Part 
II.B.1.  It was not a general and unlimited grant of power to 
the federal government.
17
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 That the Founders understood Article II, § 2 to be a 
limited grant of power is clear, as the Tenth Amendment itself 
verifies.  The available evidence of their thinking is that they 
did not intend for treaties to become a vehicle to usurp the 
general powers reserved to the states.  Cf. United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (“It is of course true that even 
treaties with foreign nations will be carefully construed so as 
not to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the 
States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the 
national policy.”); Holmes, 39 U.S. at 569 (“The power to 
make treaties … was designed to [be] … consistent with … 
the distribution of powers between the general and state 
governments.”). 
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Because an implied subject matter limitation on the 
Treaty Power was a given at the time Holland was written, it 
was enough to answer the states‟ rights question in that case 
by pointing out that the Tenth Amendment only reserves 
those powers that are not delegated and that “the power to 
make treaties is delegated expressly.”  252 U.S. at 432.  Thus, 
Holland‟s statement that “there can be no dispute about the 
validity” of a statute implementing a valid treaty, id., is 
sensible in context and, in any event, binds us.  We do not 
discount the significance of the Supreme Court‟s emphasis on 
the important role that federalism plays in preserving 
individual rights, Bond II, 131 S. Ct. at 2364, and it may be 
that there is more to say about the uncompromising language 
used in Holland than we are able to say,
18
 but that very direct 
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 We pause to consider how, if Holland were not so 
clear in its “valid treaty equal valid implementing legislation” 
holding, treaties and implementing legislation might usefully 
be reviewed in light of the apparently evolving understanding 
of the Treaty Power that we have described.  See supra Part 
II.B.1.  The Founders deliberately drafted Article II, § 2 
without defining the limits of the Treaty Power because they 
decided its scope required flexibility in the face of 
unknowable future events.  Cf. The Virginia Debates, supra, 
at 514-15 (James Madison‟s observation that “it [is not] 
possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external 
regulations would be necessary. …  It is most safe, therefore, 
to leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise”).  We 
do not second guess the wisdom of their choice and 
acknowledge that any attempt to precisely define a subject 
matter limitation on the Treaty Power would involve political 
judgments beyond our ken.  Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211 (1962) (stating that resolution of issues “touching foreign 
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relations” often “turn on standards that defy judicial 
application, or involve the exercise of a discretion 
demonstrably committed to” a coordinate branch); Pink, 315 
U.S. at 232 (“[T]he field which affects international relations 
is „the one aspect of our government that from the first has 
been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad 
national authority‟ … .” (citation omitted)); Lue, 134 F.3d at 
83 (“[I]t is not the province of the judiciary to impinge upon 
the Executive‟s prerogative in matters pertaining to foreign 
affairs.”).   
Nevertheless, while the outer boundaries of the Treaty 
Power may be hard to delineate, we can safely say that certain 
kinds of treaties fall within the core of that power, namely 
those dealing with war, peace, foreign commerce, and 
diplomacy directed to those ends.  See The Federalist No. 45 
(James Madison) (stating that the Treaty Power “will be 
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negotiation, and foreign commerce”); The Federalist No. 64 
(John Jay) (stating the “power of making treaties is an 
important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and 
commerce”).  As to treaties of such character, it is hard to 
argue with the reasoning in Holland that, because “the power 
to make treaties is delegated expressly,”  252 U.S. at 432, the 
Tenth Amendment has nothing meaningful to say.  However, 
just as some treaties may fall comfortably within the 
traditionally understood bounds of the Treaty Power, some 
may be negotiated that will plainly fall outside that scope.  If 
such a treaty were challenged, a court would be bound to take 
up an issue not present here, namely whether and when a 
treaty has reached a constitutional boundary, see Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
34 
 
                                                                                                     
to say what the law is.”); cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 
(observing that not “every case or controversy which touches 
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance”), 
recognizing that a treaty falling outside the limits of the 
Treaty Power would be unconstitutional as ultra vires, cf. 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States 339 (Melville M. Bigelow, ed. 5th ed. 1994) (1891) 
(“A treaty to change the organization of the government, or 
annihilate its sovereignty, to overturn its republican form, or 
to deprive it of its constitutional powers, would be void.”).  
The deliberately vague boundaries of the Treaty Power would 
probably relegate that court to the unenviable position of 
saying it knew a violation when it saw one.  
Before the outer limits of the treaty power are reached, 
however, it may be that federalism does have some effect on 
a treaty‟s constitutionality.  While it is not our prerogative to 
ignore Holland‟s rejection of federalism limitations upon the 
Treaty Power, the Supreme Court could clarify whether 
principles of federalism have any role in assessing an exercise 
of the Treaty Power that goes beyond the traditionally 
understood subject matter for treaties.  Holland itself 
indicates that “invisible radiation[s] from the general terms of 
the Tenth Amendment” may be pertinent in deciding whether 
there is any space between obviously valid treaties and 
obviously ultra vires treaties and whether, in that space, some 
judicial review of treaties and their implementing legislation 
may be undertaken to preserve the federal structure of our 
government.  The “invisible radiation[s]” imagery, 252 U.S. 
at 433-34, is unusual but, in light of current conceptions about 
the breadth of the Treaty Power, it may well be worth taking 
seriously.  Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921-22 (stating that the 
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language demands from us a direct acknowledgement of its 
meaning, even if the result may be viewed as simplistic.  If 
there is nuance there that has escaped us, it is for the Supreme 
Court to elucidate.
 
 
 
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
Thus, because the Convention falls comfortably within 
the Treaty Power‟s traditional subject matter limitation, the 
Act is within the constitutional powers of the federal 
government under the Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
Treaty Power, unless it somehow goes beyond the 
Convention.  Bond argues that it does.
19
   
 
She says that the Act covers a range of activity not 
actually banned by the Convention and thus cannot be 
sustained by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Whether that 
argument amounts to a facial or an as-applied attack on the 
Act, see supra note 5, it fails.  We stated in Bond I that 
“Section 229 … closely adheres to the language of the … 
                                                                                                     
concept of dual sovereignty was “one of the Constitution‟s 
structural protections of liberty”). 
19
 As Judge Rendell correctly points out in her 
concurrence, Bond‟s emphasis is entirely misplaced to the 
extent she may be contending that her prosecution violates the 
Necessary and Proper Clause because the United States did 
not have to prosecute her to comply with its obligations under 
the Convention.  (See Rendell Concurrence Op. at 3 
(“Examining the scope of Congress‟s Necessary and Proper 
Power by definition requires us to examine the Act, not its 
enforcement.”).) 
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Convention,”  581 F.3d at 138, and so it does.  True, as Bond 
notes, the Convention bans persons from using, developing, 
acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical weapons, 32 
I.L.M. at 804, while the Act makes it unlawful to “receive, 
stockpile, retain, own, possess, use, or threaten to use” a 
chemical weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1), but those 
differences in wording do not prove that the Act has 
materially expanded on the Convention.  See United States v. 
Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 806 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he existence 
of slight variances between a treaty and its congressional 
implementing legislation do not make the enactment 
unconstitutional; identicality is not required.”).  The meaning 
of the list in the former seems rather to fairly encompass the 
latter (with the possible exception of the “threaten to use” 
provision of the Act) and, if the Act goes beyond the 
Convention at all, does not do so in the “use” aspect at issue 
here.   
 
So while Bond‟s prosecution seems a questionable 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
20
 and indeed appears to 
justify her assertion that this case “trivializes the concept of 
chemical weapons” (Appellant‟s Supp. Br. at 53), the treaty 
that gave rise to it was implemented by sufficiently related 
legislation.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956  (“[I]n 
determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal 
statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means 
that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
                                              
20
 The decision to use the Act – a statute designed to 
implement a chemical weapons treaty – to deal with a jilted 
spouse‟s revenge on her rival is, to be polite, a puzzling use 
of the federal government‟s power. 
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constitutionally enumerated power.”); Lue, 134 F.3d at 84 
(rejecting the argument “that because the Hostage Taking 
Convention targets a specific aspect of international terrorism 
– hostage taking – the statute effectuating the Convention 
must deal narrowly with international terrorism or risk 
invalidity” as a “cramped” view of Congressional authority, 
because treaty-implementing legislation must simply “bear a 
rational relationship to a permissible constitutional end”).   
 
In short, because the Convention pertains to the 
proliferation and use of chemical weapons, which are matters 
plainly relating to war and peace, we think it clear that the 
Convention falls within the Treaty Power‟s core.  See supra 
note 18.  Consequently, we cannot say that the Act disrupts 
the balance of power between the federal government and the 
states, regardless of how it has been applied here.  See 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) (“[W]here the class 
of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of 
federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, 
individual instances of the class.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted));
21
 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (“If the 
                                              
21
 Although we acknowledge that the Raich court‟s 
admonition against excising a class of activities from a valid 
assertion of federal power may have related to its status as a 
Commerce Clause case based on the aggregation principle 
employed in that context, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and 
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 936 
(2011) (opining that Raich “can be read as rejecting the 
possibility of successful as-applied challenges to assertions of 
legislative power under the Commerce Clause”), the principle 
would seem to hold with respect to federalism challenges 
arising from treaties within the Treaty Power‟s core.  As we 
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treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the 
[implementing] statute … .”); cf. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 
(“[A]ll Treaties made … shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.”).  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
have already observed, see supra note 18, it is hard to argue 
with Holland‟s rejection of federalism as an applicable 
concept as far as such treaties are concerned.   
1 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I fully agree with the Majority‟s reasoning and result.  
I write separately to cast the issue before us in a somewhat 
different light, by expanding upon two aspects of the 
Majority‟s reasoning which, I believe, decide this case.  As it 
crystallized before us at oral argument, Ms. Bond‟s challenge 
has little to do with the validity of the Convention.  Her 
problem lies with the Act.  She contends that the structure of 
federal-state relations is such that the Act should not apply to 
her actions, namely, conduct involving a domestic dispute 
that could be prosecuted under state law.
1
  But, as the 
Majority rightly concludes, the Act is a valid exercise of 
Congress‟s Necessary and Proper Power.  Moreover, no 
jurisprudential principle, grounded in federalism or 
elsewhere, saves her from the Act‟s reach.   
 
I consider two questions raised by her argument: What 
is legally wrong with the Act, which reaches Ms. Bond‟s 
conduct?; and, What is wrong with the Act‟s application to 
                                              
1
 As her counsel argued:   
 
And it really inheres in the statute.  It‟s 
not that there‟s anything wrong in the abstract 
with the United States ratifying this treaty.  
That‟s not where the problem is. 
The problem is either at the moment they 
passed the statute that necessarily went this far 
or at the point that it becomes applied in this 
kind of situation. 
 
(3d Cir. Argument at 13.) 
2 
 
Ms. Bond, given the structure of federal-state relations?  The 
answer to both is: Nothing. 
 
 As to the first question, nothing “wrong” occurred at 
the moment Congress passed the Act.  As the Majority has 
thoroughly discussed, the Convention itself is valid—indeed, 
Ms. Bond unequivocally concedes that point.  In turn, the 
Act, which implements the Convention, is valid as an exercise 
of Congress‟s Necessary and Proper Power.  That is because 
the Necessary and Proper Clause affords Congress “„ample 
means‟” to implement the Convention, and gives Congress 
the authority “to enact laws that are „convenient, or useful‟ or 
„conducive‟ . . . to the „beneficial exercise‟” of the federal 
government‟s Treaty Power.  United States v. Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCullogh v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 408, 413, 418 (1819)).  There is no question that 
the Act is rationally related to the Convention; it faithfully 
tracks the language of the Convention.  Enacting a statute that 
essentially mirrors the terms of an underlying treaty is plainly 
a means which is “reasonably adapted to the attainment of a 
legitimate end”—ensuring that the United States complies 
with our international obligations under a valid treaty.  
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 
84 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding a statute implementing a treaty 
where “[t]he Act here plainly bears a rational relationship to 
the Convention; indeed, it tracks the language of the 
Convention in all material respects”).    
 
 In examining the constitutionality of Congress‟s 
exercise of its Necessary and Proper Power, we need not 
consider whether the prosecution of Ms. Bond is necessary 
and proper to complying with the Convention, as she would 
3 
 
have us do.  In other words, she argues that no nation-state 
would submit that the United States has failed to comply with 
its obligations under the Convention if the federal 
government did not prosecute Ms. Bond under the Act.  But 
that is not the appropriate test.  Examining the scope of 
Congress‟s Necessary and Proper Power by definition 
requires us to examine the Act, not its enforcement.  To 
determine if the Act is necessary and proper, we ask whether 
it bears a rational relationship to the Convention.  See 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (“[I]n determining whether the 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative 
authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see 
whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally 
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.”).  Ms. Bond‟s actions fall plainly within the terms of 
the Act, and the Act bears a rational relationship to the 
Convention.  So ends the Necessary and Proper inquiry.   
 
The foregoing conclusion is enough to affirm Ms. 
Bond‟s conviction.  As the Majority correctly reasons, 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), forecloses 
challenging a valid statute implementing a valid treaty on 
Necessary and Proper grounds or federalism grounds.  See 
Maj. Op. at 31-35; Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (“If the treaty is 
valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause).   
 
But even if Ms. Bond were able to assert a federalism 
challenge to her conviction, she proposes no principle of 
federalism that would limit the federal government‟s 
authority to prosecute her under the Act.  Thus, as to the 
second question, Ms. Bond argues that if the statute is applied 
to her, and, is thus read to “criminalize every malicious use of 
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poisoning,” then principles of federalism are violated by 
disturbing the division of power between the federal 
government and the states.  (3d Cir. Argument at 15.)  As 
appealing as the argument sounds—that a federal statute 
should not reach an essentially local offense like this—there 
is in fact no principled reason to limit the Act‟s reach when 
her conduct is squarely prohibited by it.  The fact that an 
otherwise constitutional federal statute might criminalize 
conduct considered to be local does not render that particular 
criminalization unconstitutional.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Gonzales v. Raich, when “the class of activities 
is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, 
individual instances of the class.”  545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The fact that 
the Act, which properly implements a valid treaty, reaches 
non-terrorist uses of chemical weapons leaves us powerless to 
excise such an individual instance.  True, Raich involved 
Congress‟s Commerce Clause Power.  But the Majority is 
correct to apply its principle to this case, particularly in light 
of the Supreme Court‟s rejection, in Holland, of federalism as 
a basis to challenge a statute implementing an otherwise valid 
treaty.  See Maj. Op. at 37 n.21; Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.   
 
Ms. Bond continues to urge otherwise, asking us to 
consider the “world where the Supreme Court recognizes that 
the Tenth Amendment is primarily about protecting 
individual liberty,” (3d Cir. Argument at 74), and to find 
controlling here cases like New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997), in which the Supreme Court recognized that some 
acts of Congress, even if they are otherwise valid under an 
enumerated power, can run afoul of the Tenth Amendment.  
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But this case is not like New York or Printz, in which 
Congress wrongfully commandeered states‟ legislative 
processes and public officials.  Nothing in those cases 
suggests a principle of federalism that would apply to this 
case.   
 
Moreover, it is not enough to urge, as Ms. Bond does, 
that Pennsylvania law and authorities are equally able to 
handle, and punish, this conduct so that, from a federalism 
standpoint, we should leave the matter to Pennsylvania.  That 
view simply misstates the law.  We have a system of dual 
sovereignty.  Instances of overlapping federal and state 
criminalization of similar conduct abound.  But Ms. Bond 
argues that here, unlike the case with other federal crimes, no 
federal interest is being served by prosecuting every 
malicious use of a chemical.  That argument fails for two 
reasons.  First, there exists nowhere in the law a rule requiring 
that a statute implementing a treaty contain an element 
explicitly tying the statute to a federal interest so as to ensure 
that a particular application of the statute is constitutional.  
Cf. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(reasoning that a jurisdictional element is not constitutionally 
required in a federal criminal statute enacted pursuant to 
Congress‟s Commerce Clause authority).  Second, even if we 
were to require that there be a clear federal interest, Ms. Bond 
incorrectly characterizes the federal interest that is 
represented by her prosecution as one in prosecuting every 
malicious use of a chemical.  Rather, the federal interest 
served is twofold: combating the use and proliferation of 
chemical weapons, and complying with the United States‟ 
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obligations under a valid treaty.
2
  See Chemical Weapons 
Convention, art. VII.1, 32 I.L.M. 800, 810 (1993) (requiring 
each signatory nation to, “in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to 
implement its obligations under this Convention”).  
Additionally, whether there is a distinction, and where that 
distinction lies, between combating the use and proliferation 
of chemical weapons and prosecuting the malicious use of a 
chemical, is exceedingly difficult to discern.   
 
In sum, Congress passed the Act, which is 
constitutionally sound legislation, to implement the 
Convention, a constitutionally sound treaty.  Ms. Bond‟s 
appeal generally to federalism, rather than to a workable 
principle that would limit the federal government‟s authority 
to apply the Act to her, is to no avail. 
 
The real culprits here are three.  First, the fact pattern.  
No one would question a prosecution under the Act if the 
defendant were a deranged person who scattered potassium 
dichromate and 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine, the chemicals 
which Ms. Bond used, on the seats of the New York subway 
cars.  While that defendant could be punished under state law, 
applying the Act there would not offend our sensibilities.  The 
                                              
2
 I agree with Ms. Bond that states sometimes also bear some 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with our treaty 
obligations.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).  But 
that fact does not nullify Congress‟s authority to pass treaty-
implementing legislation so as to ensure uniform, nationwide 
compliance with our international obligations, nor does it 
suggest that Congress lacks the power to do so.     
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application, however, to this “domestic dispute,” somehow 
does. 
 
Second, the “use” of chemical weapons as prescribed 
in the Act has an admittedly broad sweep.  See Maj. Op. at 11 
n.7; Chemical Weapons Convention, art. VII.1(a), 32 I.L.M. 
at 810 (requiring each signatory nation to “[p]rohibit natural 
and legal persons anywhere on its territory . . . from 
undertaking any activity prohibited . . . under this 
Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect 
to such activity”).  Because the Act tracks the Convention, 
however, Congress had the power to criminalize all such uses.  
Perhaps, in carrying out the United States‟ treaty obligations, 
Congress could have created a more expansive exception for 
“peaceful purposes,” but it did not.   
 
Lastly, the decision to prosecute is troubling.  The 
judgment call to prosecute Ms. Bond under a chemical 
weapons statute rather than allowing state authorities to 
process the case is one that we question.  But we see that 
every day in drug cases.  Perhaps lured by the perception of 
easier convictions and tougher sentences, prosecutors opt to 
proceed federally.  See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: 
The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643, 
668-75 (1997).  There is no law against this, or principle that 
we can call upon, to limit or regulate it.   
 
While the Majority opinion explores arguments 
regarding the limits of the Treaty Power, I find Ms. Bond‟s 
argument to be much more limited in scope, although equally 
unsupportable.  I agree that we should affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I concur in the result reached by Judge Jordan‟s 
thoughtful opinion.  I write separately to urge the Supreme 
Court to provide a clarifying explanation of its statement in 
Missouri v. Holland that “[i]f [a] treaty is valid there can be 
no dispute about the validity of the statute [implementing that 
treaty] under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper 
means to execute the powers of the Government.”  252 U.S. 
416, 432 (1920).
1
 
 
Absent that undertaking, a blank check exists for the 
Federal Government to enact any laws that are rationally 
related to a valid treaty and that do not transgress affirmative 
constitutional restrictions, like the First Amendment.  This 
acquirable police power, however, can run counter to the 
fundamental principle that the Constitution delegates powers 
to the Federal Government that are “few and defined” while 
the States retain powers that are “numerous and indefinite.” 
The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison).  
 
                                              
1
 As I noted in our Court‟s previous opinion in this case, see 
United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2009), 
rev’d in part by, Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355 
(2011), the scope and persuasiveness of Holland has 
generated much academic debate. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Executing The Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
1867 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain 
the Treaty Power?, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 403 (2003); Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 390 (1998). 
2 
 
 Since Holland, Congress has largely resisted testing 
the outer bounds of its treaty-implementing authority.  See 
Peter J. Spiro, Resurrecting Missouri v. Holland, 73 Mo. L. 
Rev. 1029 (2008).  But if ever there were a statute that did 
test those limits, it would be Section 229.  With its shockingly 
broad definitions, Section 229 federalizes purely local, run-
of-the-mill criminal conduct.  The statute is a troublesome 
example of the Federal Government‟s appetite for criminal 
lawmaking.
2
  Sweeping statutes like Section 229 are in deep 
tension with an important structural feature of our 
Government:  “„The States possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law.‟”  Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)); see also Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (“It goes without saying that 
preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business 
of the States than it is of the Federal Government . . . .”).   
 
                                              
2
 “[T]he federal criminal code now includes at least 4,450 
crimes.  Congress added an average of 56.5 crimes per year to 
the federal code between 2000 and 2007 and has raised the 
total number of federal crimes by 40 percent since 1970.  
Moreover, the federal criminal code has grown not just in size 
but in complexity, making it difficult to both (1) determine 
what statutes constitute crimes and (2) differentiate whether a 
single statute with different acts listed within a section or 
subsection includes more than a single crime and, if so, how 
many.” John C. Eastman, The Outer Bounds of Criminal 
Law:  Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2011 
Cato. Sup. Ct. Rev. 185, 193 (2011) (internal footnotes, 
quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 
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I hope that the Supreme Court will soon flesh out 
“[t]he most important sentence in the most important case 
about the constitutional law of foreign affairs,” Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing The Treaty Power, 118 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1867, 1868 (2005), and, doing so, clarify (indeed 
curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws that 
intrude on matters so local that no drafter of the Convention 
contemplated their inclusion in it.   
 
